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DO VOLUNTARY CORPORATE EFFORTS 
IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE?: THE EMPIRICAL 
LITERATURE 
Kurt A. Strasser* 
Abstract: Many companies are adopting environmental performance 
programs that aim to go beyond regulatory compliance and provide 
greater environmental protection. How effective are they in doing so? 
This Article collects and surveys the empirical studies of environmental 
performance of these programs and presents a picture of mixed results. 
When companies adopt environmental management systems, their regu-
latory performance and nonregulated environmental impacts often im-
prove. There is little empirical support, however, for the proposition that 
these systems are associated with design and implementation of greener 
products or processes. When companies adopt voluntary environmental 
performance standards, the evidence is mixed; it seems to suggest that 
these standards are not associated with improved performance. Yet a 
qualification is needed here: both the company programs and the em-
pirical studies are relatively new and these results may well change as the 
programs become more institutionalized within the companies, and the 
studies have access to better data. 
Introduction 
 Corporations are increasingly making voluntary efforts to protect 
the environment. These efforts are sometimes undertaken as part of a 
governmental initiative, sometimes as part of a trade association pro-
gram, and sometimes they are undertaken by an individual company. 
Whatever the structure, they all share the feature of voluntariness, at 
least in the sense that they are not required as part of an environmental 
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regulation. Do these voluntary efforts actually result in improved envi-
ronmental performance by the companies that make them? A number 
of scholars have done empirical studies of this question, and this Article 
will review them. 
I. Varieties of Voluntary Programs 
 For the purposes of this Article, voluntary programs will be 
grouped into two principle types. The first type is comprised of envi-
ronmental management systems (EMSs), which have become increas-
ingly popular and more familiar over the last several years.1 EMSs are 
management systems designed to structure a corporation’s environ-
mental protection efforts and, hopefully, to move the company into 
regulatory compliance and beyond. As management systems, however, 
they do not in and of themselves entail a commitment to any specified 
level of environmental performance, although one hopes that better 
performance will follow the management effort.2 
 These EMSs typically incorporate a statement of company policy 
about environmental protection, and they generally are set up with a 
degree of involvement by top management of the firm. EMSs also 
usually establish a system for evaluating a company’s environmental 
impacts and for managing these impacts throughout the entire com-
pany hierarchy, based on the familiar management idea “plan, do, 
check.” A core justification for establishing an EMS is that conscious 
attention to environmental management throughout the organization 
will generate better environmental performance. Companies can ob-
tain certification of their EMSs through the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO) by applying the standards set forth in 
ISO 14001.3 This certification involves monitoring the company to 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management-Based Strategies: An Emerging Approach 
to Environmental Protection, in Leveraging the Private Sector: Management-Based 
Strategies for Improving Environmental Performance 3 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer 
Nash eds., 2006). Professors Florida and Davison estimate that “roughly a quarter (24%) of 
manufacturing plants with more than 50 employees have adopted an EMS.” Richard Florida 
& Derek Davison, Why Do Firms Adopt Advanced Environmental Practices (And Do They Make a 
Difference)?, in Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems 
Achieve Policy Goals? 82, 86 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). 
2 See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 1, at 3–8 (providing a good, short introduction); 
Jennifer Nash & John R. Ehrenfeld, Factors That Shape EMS Outcomes in Firms, in Regulating 
from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals?, 
supra note 1, at 61, 62–68. 
3 See generally Susan Summers Raines & Christian Haumesser, ISO 14001 in the United 
States: Good News on the Question of Hype Versus Hope, 4 Envtl. Prac. 163 (2002), available at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FENP%2FENP4_03%2FS14660466
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ensure that there really is a management system and that it is being 
implemented. This check is typically done by third-party auditors, al-
though a company may use its own employees if they have been 
trained and certified as auditors. Finally, EMSs often incorporate pub-
lic reporting of the company’s environmental efforts. 
 The second type of corporate environmental program considered 
in this Article is a voluntary commitment to achieve a specified level of 
performance. For example, a company or industry trade association 
might commit to reducing its toxic waste discharges, or its energy use, 
by twenty percent over the next five years. These voluntary commit-
ments can be made through one of three different categories of pro-
grams. The first category consists of government-sponsored programs, 
such as Performance Track or WasteWise.4 Under the terms of these 
programs, companies that join commit to a specified level of environ-
mental action or reporting, or both; in exchange they receive public 
recognition, technical advice and networking opportunities, and some-
times fewer regular inspections or other regulatory concessions. The 
goal is to encourage companies to take their environmental perform-
ance beyond regulatory compliance. A second category of voluntary 
performance program includes those programs that are sponsored by 
trade associations or other industry groups. The Responsible Care pro-
gram of the International Council of Chemical Associations is one of 
the most familiar of these types of programs.5 Companies that commit 
to these programs typically promise specific environmental activities 
and performance, receiving industry recognition as well as technical 
assistance and advice. A third category is made up of company efforts 
undertaken by an individual company simply committing itself to a 
specific environmental performance target, such as a twenty-five percent 
reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.6 Whatever their organiza-
tional structure, a key question is whether these voluntary performance 
standards are actually associated with improved environmental per-
formance by the companies. This Article will survey the empirical litera-
                                                                                                                      
02021257a.pdf&code=6b7b66eee565fe4a9a01ec5fab104dcd (providing an introduction to 
the ISO system). 
4 National Environmental Performance Track, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/perftrac 
(last visited May 6, 2008); WasteWise, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/wastewise (last visited 
May 6, 2008). 
5 International Council of Chemical Associations, Responsible Care, http://www.re- 
sponsiblecare.org (last visited May 6, 2008). 
6 See BSDglobal.com, Business and Sustainable Development: A Global Guide, Volun-
tary Schemes, http://www.bsdglobal.com/issues/climate_voluntary_schemes.asp (last vis-
ited May 6, 2008) (providing examples of individual company programs). 
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ture; unfortunately, it concludes that for the most part this association 
has not been shown. 
II. What Is Environmental Performance? 
 This Article will consider studies that measure any of the three 
major aspects of performance. First, it will consider studies that meas-
ure how well companies succeed in minimizing their regulated dis-
charges into the environment, typically discharges into air or water, or 
toxic releases.7 As part of this analysis, the Article will consider the 
extent to which voluntary efforts are associated with improved com-
pany compliance with environmental regulation. The second aspect 
of environmental performance that this Article will consider is how 
well a company performs with nonregulated uses of resources, such as 
minimizing energy use, water use, and raw materials inputs. Third, 
this Article will examine what the empirical literature conveys about 
the impact of voluntary programs on company attempts to adopt 
cleaner production processes and to design cleaner products. 
 In measuring the impact of company adoption of voluntary pro-
grams, it is necessary to have a point of comparison for environmental 
performance, and the studies considered here have used different 
ones. The preferred measure is a comparison of company perform-
ance to an external standard, such as the performance of a control 
group of similar companies that did not adopt the program or, as an 
alternative, comparison to the average performance for the industry. 
Several of the studies use this measure and are, therefore, the most 
illuminating. On occasion, however, studies compare a company’s 
current performance to its own earlier performance, measuring it 
before and after adoption of the voluntary program. This Article will 
consider these studies as well. While these studies are useful, their 
utility is limited because they do not allow for other factors influenc-
ing the company’s performance, such as the well-known tendency for 
reported Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) releases to decline industry-
wide—and indeed economy-wide—over time.8 To understand the im-
pact of voluntary programs on any TRI reduction, one would like to 
                                                                                                                      
7 This analysis will emphasize studies of measured environmental performance. While 
there is substantial literature that uses opinion surveys to determine performance, it will 
be used only sparingly here. 
8 See Press Release, EPA, EPA Releases Most Recent Community Right-to-Know Data on 
Toxic Releases ( June 18, 1998), http://www.epa.gov/newsroom/index.htm (search “Right-
to-Know Data on Toxic Releases”). 
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allow for consideration of the industry-wide changes that take place 
simultaneously and presumably result from other causes. 
 Do voluntary programs improve environmental performance? 
This Article will start by considering the extent to which adoption of 
an EMS is associated with improved performance. 
III. Do EMSs Improve Performance? 
A. Regulated Discharges: Air, Water, and Toxic Releases 
 Most of the empirical studies find that implementation of an EMS 
is associated with better performance on regulated discharges, namely 
air, water, and toxic releases.9 A leading study by the National Database 
on Environmental Management Systems (NDEMS) found this result to 
be the case for firms whose performance was measured on indicators 
chosen in advance by the companies: “[T]he introduction of an EMS 
can be expected to be at least somewhat beneficial to the environ-
mental performance of most facilities, as well as to their operating and 
management efficiencies, and in some cases to their regulatory compli-
ance patterns.”10 This conclusion resulted from an in-depth study of 
                                                                                                                      
9 Richard N.L. Andrews et al., Environmental Management Under Pressure: How Do Man-
dates Affect Performance?, in Leveraging the Private Sector: Management-Based 
Strategies for Improving Environmental Performance, supra note 1, at 111, 117–19 
(“Empirical studies to date report modest but predominantly positive impacts of EMS’s on 
environmental performance.”). Similar conclusions are reported by European studies. See 
Julia Hertin et al., Are “Soft” Policy Instruments Effective? The Link Between Environmental Man-
agement Systems and the Environmental Performance of Companies 14–15 (SEWPS–SPRU Elec-
tronic Working Paper Series, Paper No. 124, 2004), available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/ 
spru/documents/sewp124.pdf. 
Professors Florida and Davison evaluated survey data and concluded, “The results are 
clear: EMS plants are nearly twice as likely to report P2 [pollution prevention] as a source 
of plant level improvement (93.5% versus 69.7%) and three times more likely to view EMS 
as the source of significant in plant improvements (79% versus 28.3%).” Florida & Davi-
son, supra note 1, at 90. Other sources of improvement found in the study included recy-
cling (93.5% versus 69.0%), air emissions reduction (88.7% versus 53.5%), solid waste 
reduction (75.8% versus 54.5%), and decreased electrical use (67.7% versus 43.4%). Id. at 
90–91. 
The Performance Track program of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
difficult to categorize, as it requires adoption of an EMS, but has additional requirements. 
Office of Inspector Gen., EPA, Evaluation Report: Performance Track Could Im-
prove Program Design and Management to Ensure Value 4–5 (2007), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2007/20070329-2007-P-00013.pdf (evaluating the program); 
see discussion infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
10 Nat’l Database on Envtl. Mgmt. Sys., Dept. of Pub. Policy, Univ. of N.C. at 
Chapel Hill, Environmental Management Systems: Do They Improve Perform-
ance?, Project Final Report, Executive Summary, at ES-25 (2003) (emphasis omitted), 
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data reported by participating firms. The extensive data covered a two-
year baseline period prior to adoption of the EMS, as well as a three-
year period of operating under it. Eighty-one firms originally began the 
study, although only thirty-one reported throughout the entire period. 
The data collected was quite comprehensive, and the analysis found 
EMS adoption to be generally associated with better performance.11 
This study considered firms that had adopted EMSs and volunteered to 
participate in NDEMS; many of the volunteers had been recruited by 
state and federal regulators.12 The study’s depth of information makes 
it useful, but to obtain this much information, the NDEMS used a non-
random sample and ultimately had a small sample size. These limita-
tions must be noted in evaluating the study’s conclusions. 
 Similar conclusions emerged from several studies that evaluated 
reported TRI data. One substantial study used regression analysis to 
evaluate TRI data on 500 firms for the years 1994 and 1995.13 It found 
that EMS adoption was associated with lower toxic emissions and, fur-
ther, that this result was stronger for firms that had more comprehen-
sive EMSs, supporting the inference that the EMSs had substantial ef-
fects.14 In this study, “comprehensiveness” of an EMS was determined 
by considering a large number of different variables covered by the 
EMS, including inspections, number of Superfund sites, public disclo-
sures, and toxic releases.15 Firms with more comprehensive EMSs 
tended to have greater improvement in overall environmental per-
formance. The result is particularly persuasive because the study con-
trolled for changes in the firms’ production levels by calculating the 
                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.c2e2.org/documents/completeexecutivesummary.pdf [hereinafter 
NDEMS]. 
11 More than two-thirds of the tracked Environmental Performance Indicators (EPIs) 
showed improvement, and approximately 56% of the reporting facilities experienced im-
provement. Id. at ES-4. However, 18% of the EPIs produced worse outcomes than before 
the EMS was adopted, although in only one facility did more than half of the EPIs decline. 
Id. In contrast, over 60% of facilities reported improvements in at least half the indicators 
associated with their EMS objectives and targets, and less than one-third experienced dete-
rioration of the same indicators. Id. at ES-4 to –5. 
12 Id. at ES-24. 
13 Wilma Rose Q. Anton et al., Incentives for Environmental Self-Regulation and Implications 
for Environmental Performance, 48 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 632, 634 (2004). 
14 Id. The study examined firms that were included in the Corporate Environmental 
Profile Directories, which was compiled from firm surveys by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center for 1994 and 1995. Id. at 632–34. The results were strongest for the firms 
that discharged the most pollution prior to adopting EMSs and subsequently adopted the 
most comprehensive EMSs. Id. at 652. The study compared a firm’s performance before 
and after adopting an EMS. Id. at 634–40. 
15 Id. at 635–36. 
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ratio of toxic emissions to sales. Several other studies have reached simi-
lar results, looking at TRI data to compare an individual company’s re-
leases before and after adoption of an EMS.16 These general results are 
reflected in outcomes reported in survey-based studies of Austrian17 
and Mexican companies18 as well. An earlier study found that firms with 
more environmental management activities had better performance on 
environmental spills.19 
 After a company adopts an EMS, is further improvement associ-
ated with taking the next step and having it certified for ISO compli-
ance? Most of these studies do not purport to answer this question. The 
two studies that did consider it both found that EMS adoption was the 
important factor for environmental performance, and that certification 
in and of itself was not associated with further improvements.20 The 
most persuasive explanation, offered by both studies, is that certifica-
                                                                                                                      
16 Andrew A. King et al., The Strategic Use of Decentralized Institutions: Exploring Certification 
with the ISO 14001 Management Standard 30 (Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 15, 2004), http://www.hks.har- 
vard.edu/mrcbg/papers/seminars/Lenox_october_05.pdf (comparing actual toxic releases 
with predicted releases for the firms); see Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Covenants with 
Weak Swords: ISO 14001 and Facilities’ Environmental Performance, 24 J. Pol’y Analysis & 
Mgmt. 745, 763, (2005) (“These analyses provide some evidence that, compared to non-
certified facilities, ISO 14001-certified facilities experienced significantly larger reductions in 
pollution emissions, controlling for other factors and the endogeneity between facilities’ 
decisions to join ISO 14001 and their environmental performance.”); Michal Szymanksi & 
Piyush Tiwari, ISO 14001 and the Reduction of Toxic Emissions, 7 J. Econ. Pol’y Reform 31, 41–
42 (2004) (examining TRI data linked with 264 ISO-certified manufacturing facilities in the 
United States from 1996 to 2001). 
17 Elisabeth Schylander & André Martinuzzi, ISO 14001—Experiences, Effects and Future 
Challenges: A National Study in Austria, 16 Bus. Strategy & Env’t 133, 139 (2007) (survey-
ing companies for their evaluations of EMS effectiveness and summarizing the results). 
Waste and recycling were reported to have shown the greatest improvements, with air and 
water discharges somewhat lower, although the absolute level of improvement was not 
shown. Id. 
18 Susmita Dasgupta et al., What Improves Environmental Compliance? Evidence from Mexi-
can Industry, 39 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 39, 61–62 (2000) (using regression to analyze 
data from a World Bank sponsored survey of 236 facilities chosen to represent Mexican 
factories by sector, size, class, and location). 
19 Jonathan Naimon et al., Do Environmental Management Programs Improve Environmental 
Performance Trends? A Study of Standard & Poors 500 Companies, Envtl. Quality Mgmt., 
Autumn 1997, at 81, 81 (using regression analysis to compare data on environmental man-
agement features collected in a 1992 survey of S&P 500 firms by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center with environmental trend data for S&P 500 firms from 1994). 
20 NDEMS, supra note 10, at ES-25; King, supra note 16, at 30. Another study that com-
pared the effects of four different U.S. voluntary programs found, however, that ISO 14001 
certification was the most effective tool in improving performance. S.A. Melnyk et al., As-
sessing the Effectiveness of US Voluntary Environmental Programmes: An Empirical Study, 40 Int’l 
J. Production Res. 1853, 1875 (2002). 
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tion is done primarily as a representation to outside stakeholders, while 
it is adoption of the EMS that actually impacts performance. 
 Yet, as is so often the case with empirical work, this consensus is 
not complete. One important recent study reached conclusions that 
are inconsistent with the results reported above.21 This study found no 
statistically significant difference between the environmental perform-
ance of firms with ISO-certified EMSs and a control group of similar 
firms that had not implemented EMSs.22 This study used a more nu-
anced measure of performance than most. Rather than looking solely 
to the volume of TRI materials released, as the studies reported above 
had done, this study used a toxicity ranking system to allow for risk of 
harm created by the relative toxicity of all materials released, as well as 
their volumes. Thus, it measured the total relative toxicity of releases 
rather than just the aggregate number of pounds of toxic materials re-
leased. This control allowed for a change in the composition of a com-
pany’s toxic waste stream discharge to be reflected. The study also 
normalized releases for production volume. It considered toxicity 
measured over five- and ten-year periods. The care with which the study 
was constructed—allowing for relative toxicity and production volume, 
and using a control group of firms for comparison—should be noted. 
Its results are an important qualification to the general consensus pre-
sented above, and the study certainly deserves to be counted in the 
overall survey of the literature. 
 Finally, one must consider what these studies say about whether 
companies that implement EMSs also show better regulatory compli-
ance. Unfortunately, straightforward conclusions are not possible be-
cause the work done on this question, while quite substantial, reports 
conflicting results. One of the most careful efforts used regression 
analysis to look at the compliance performance of 3700 firms, four per-
cent of which had ISO-certified EMSs.23 It found that the firms with 
                                                                                                                      
21 Ryan A. Harding et al., The Role of ISO 14001 in Environmental Management at 
U.S. Manufacturing Facilities 51 (Apr. 7, 2003) (unpublished Group Project in Master’s 
Program, Bren School, U.C. Santa Barbara), available at http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/re- 
search/2003Group_Projects/iso/Final/iso_final.pdf. The study sought to examine 484 
facilities, although only 198 responded with data. Id. at 25. The toxicity ranking system was 
based on Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) permissible exposure 
limits and likely pathways of exposure. Id. at 21–22. 
22 Id. at 51. 
23 Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 
and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance, 49 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 235, 240 (2005). The facilities studied 
were some of the 3700 firms that had their air pollution regulated and performance re-
ported in EPA’s Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis database. Id. 
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EMSs spent less time out of compliance with air toxic regulations— 
about twenty-five days per year on average—and concluded that “join-
ing ISO 14001 does improve regulatory compliance beyond what likely 
would have occurred had the facilities not joined the program.”24 One 
problem in studying this question is determining whether the EMS im-
proves performance, whether better performance influences the deci-
sion to implement an EMS, or whether both changes are determined 
by other company factors and management strategies. This study al-
lowed for such a consideration by using sophisticated statistical meth-
ods to “isolate the impact of facilities’ ISO 14001 membership on regu-
latory compliance from other factors that induce facilities to join ISO 
14001 and comply with regulations in the first place.”25 Thus, the result 
is more reliable because the study controlled for this endogenous prob-
lem. Other studies have reached consistent conclusions.26 
 Yet several substantial studies reach the opposite conclusion, find-
ing that implementing an EMS is not associated with improved regula-
tory compliance. For example, the NDEMS study discussed above, ad-
mittedly an in-depth look at a small sample, found no statistically 
significant reduction in regulatory violations after implementing an 
EMS, although it did note that the number of facilities reporting viola-
tions declined from fifteen to six.27 One European study looked at the 
measured environmental compliance of a group of small- and medium-
sized companies and similarly concluded that implementing an EMS 
was not associated with better regulatory compliance.28 While these 
studies are substantial, variations in sample size and composition, meas-
urements of regulatory compliance, and the inevitable imperfections of 
social science empirical research surely contribute to the difference in 
results. From a policy perspective, this difference means that, while cur-
                                                                                                                      
24 Id. at 246. 
25 Id. at 240. 
26 Dasgupta et al., supra note 18, at 61 (reviewing Mexican companies, and finding that 
“[p]lants which institute ISO 14001-type internal management procedures exhibit superior 
environmental compliance”); Melnyk et al., supra note 20, at 1875–76 (comparing various 
voluntary programs); see Hertin et al., supra note 9, at 7 (citing two German studies). 
27 NDEMS, supra note 10, at ES-15 to -16. (finding improvement “in some cases,” but 
not overall); Andrews et al., supra note 9, at 116–20 (reaching a similar, negative conclu-
sion in their study of 617 responding facilities that were all TRI reporters). Professors Dar-
nall and Carmin report that only twenty-five percent of the voluntary programs in their 
study use regulatory compliance as a screening device for participation. Nicole Darnall & 
Joann Carmin, Greener and Cleaner? The Signaling Accuracy of the U.S. Voluntary Environmental 
Program, 38 Pol’y Sciences 71, 78 (2005). 
28 Kristina Dahlström et al., Environmental Management Systems and Company Performance: 
Assessing the Case for Risk-Based Regulation, 13 Eur. Env’t 187, 199 (2003). 
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rently there is a significant amount of intriguing data, a workable em-
pirical answer to whether implementing an EMS is associated with im-
proved regulatory compliance is not yet available. When the inquiry 
shifts to the effect of nonregulated environmental impacts, the answer 
becomes clearer. 
B. Nonregulated Resource Use 
 In addition to the regulated discharges discussed above, company 
facilities have many other impacts on the environment, ones that are 
not directly regulated for environmental effect. For example, facilities 
discharge ordinary wastes and use energy, water, storage, and trans-
portation. All of the studies to date that have considered these kinds 
of environmental impacts have found that firms that implement EMSs 
have better performance in these areas. While the specific environ-
mental impacts considered have varied somewhat among the studies, 
energy and water use reductions were most consistently found, fol-
lowed by improved waste management practices and better materials 
use.29 One Swedish study of joint EMS programs among twenty-six 
mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises also found a forty-four 
percent decrease in energy use and a thirty-two percent reduction in 
materials use. This study looked further, however, and also found 
broader benefits, including improved waste handling and recycling 
procedures, the spread of district heating schemes, improved storage, 
decreased transportation needs, and some substitution of goods.30 
 Although these studies did not purport to measure empirically why 
these kinds of improvements appear so consistently, they do offer some 
reasonable interpretations of the data. Better performance on non-
regulated resource uses are likely to result in immediate, direct cost 
savings and, thus, will clearly be visible and attractive targets for the fa-
cility’s managers. In addition, because these environmental impacts 
have not been subject to direct environmental regulation before, they 
                                                                                                                      
29 NDEMS, supra note 10, at ES-13 (finding improvements in energy, water, and mate-
rials use); Andrews et al., supra note 9, at 117–19 (reporting improved energy use); Hertin 
et al., supra note 9, at 6 (finding improvements in energy, water, and waste management); 
see also Jonas Ammenberg & Olaf Hjelm, Tracing Business and Environmental Effects of Envi-
ronmental Management Systems—A study of Networking Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Using 
a Joint Environmental Management System, 12 Bus. Strategy & Env’t 163, 164–65 (2003). 
The Ammenberg study used self-reported performance data gathered in interviews with 
company environmental coordinators and is limited by its admittedly small sample of 
twenty-six participating enterprises. Id. It reported the results of the interviews without 
statistical analysis. Id. at 166–70. 
30 Ammenberg & Hjelm, supra note 29, at 170. 
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may have received less management attention in the past, and so, there 
may be more room for improvement in the initial effort. Of course, to 
the extent that this second interpretation is correct, it would imply that 
these consistently positive results have been influenced by first-time ef-
forts, making the results harder to duplicate over time. Certainly, future 
empirical studies should be sensitive to the possibility that performance 
improvements may be a one-time result of directed management atten-
tion, rather than an indicator of future improvements. That said, these 
results do offer a convincing policy rationale for supporting EMSs: they 
may be a way to reach important environmental impacts that have not 
been controlled by traditional regulatory tools. 
 In addition to resource use, it is important to determine if im-
plementing an EMS is associated with environmentally superior oper-
ating changes, such as designing and adopting environmentally supe-
rior products and processes. Here the empirical results to date have 
been consistent; unfortunately, they have not been positive. 
C. Nonregulated Operating Changes: Greener Products and Processes 
 Finding ways to motivate companies to develop greener products 
and processes is particularly important to environmental policy. Yet the 
task is challenging; developing greener products and processes requires 
innovative, creative efforts by companies, as well as consistent, sustained 
financial and other support throughout the decisionmaking levels of 
the organizations. Our traditional regulatory system has made real pro-
gress over the last forty years in controlling emissions and other envi-
ronmental impacts by regulating harmful behavior and thereby provid-
ing cleaner air, water, and land. This regulatory system, however, has 
been less successful at inspiring innovative change that improves envi-
ronmental performance beyond the improvement required for regula-
tory compliance. Such change is needed. In environmental policy cir-
cles, there is widespread concern that the traditional regulatory system 
will have increasing trouble attaining further environmental improve-
ment, and that the traditional system may be inadequate to effectively 
require the next generation of improvements that are necessary to pur-
sue real sustainability.31 Current environmental regulation works rea-
sonably well to control harmful behavior, but it is a blunt and imperfect 
tool when used to inspire and motivate creative responses that lead to 
greener products and processes—and eventually to a more sustainable 
                                                                                                                      
31 See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, The New Environmental Regulation 59–120 (2006) 
(chapters three and four). 
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society. Additional policy tools are needed to achieve this larger goal, 
and many have hoped that EMSs would be such tools. 
 Unfortunately, the empirical studies to date have not found that 
EMSs can achieve the desired result. Each of the studies that have 
evaluated this question have found that EMSs are not associated with 
the development of cleaner, greener products or processes.32 A Swed-
ish study focused specifically on the process of product design. This 
small but interesting study concluded that implementing EMSs did 
not influence product design decisions because EMSs were too rigid 
and specific for this turbulent process.33 Considering the extensive 
individual and institutional thinking required for far-reaching prod-
uct design innovation, the result is not surprising. 
 More generally, these studies argue that company decisions to 
fundamentally change products and processes are not made at the level 
where an EMS has its greatest impact. The focus of attention in imple-
menting an EMS is on the particular facility, because it is within a par-
ticular facility that most of the real work for an EMS takes place. Yet, 
the argument runs, fundamental redesign of products or processes re-
quires sustained creative effort, sustained financial commitment, and a 
willingness to confront the substantial business risks that are presented 
by the processes. These requirements must have support within the fa-
cility, but they also require top management support at the national 
level. While this explanation is certainly plausible and persuasive, it 
goes beyond the empirical results. Whatever the merits of the rationale, 
the empirical findings to date are illuminating, though not conclusive 
given the difficulty of measuring the motivations for innovation. That 
said, the current group of EMSs have not been shown to be effective in 
requiring or inspiring the necessary fundamental product and process 
innovations. 
 A most interesting case study by Professors Gunningham, Kagan, 
and Thornton offers useful insight on this problem.34 This study was 
                                                                                                                      
32 See NDEMS, supra note 10, at ES-25; Andrews et al., supra note 9, at 117–20. It must 
be acknowledged that innovation is a difficult question to study empirically, and even more 
so when one is trying to determine what motivates it. The evidence available, while illumi-
nating, cannot be taken as definitive at this time. 
33 Petrus Kautto, New Instruments—Old Practices? The Implications of Environmental Man-
agement Systems and Extended Producer Responsibility for Design for the Environment, 15 Bus. 
Strategy & Env’t 377, 383 (2006). This study looked in-depth at three firms as case stud-
ies and evaluated survey responses from 101 firms, which represented fifty-three percent of 
the group originally solicited. Id. at 382. 
34 See Neil Gunningham et al., Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, and En-
vironment 135–56 (2003). 
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an in-depth examination of fourteen pulp and paper mills located 
worldwide.35 In general, all the mills in question had good records of 
compliance with environmental regulation, and such regulation had 
in fact driven significant positive technological change and perform-
ance improvement.36 This study went further and specifically consid-
ered why some mills made the investment to go beyond regulatory 
compliance, while others did not. 
 The study found that the style of environmental management was 
the most important factor, more important than the national regula-
tory regime, the mill’s corporate size, or its earnings. Yet there was a 
great deal of variation in the extent to which mills went beyond com-
pliance and the reasons they did so. The study found that manage-
ment style was the best explanatory variable. “By management style we 
refer to a combination of managerial attitudes and actions that mark 
the intensity and character of each management’s commitment to 
environmental compliance and improvement.”37 Style was measured 
by structured interviews with individual members of management, 
which were scored and compared.38 This approach was important, as 
it enabled the study to separate the evaluation of management style 
from the evaluation of facility environmental performance. 
 This intensive study offers a much deeper look into the specific 
mills and management styles studied, although the in-depth look was 
obtained at the cost of a larger sample size. This careful look inside 
the facilities does offer substantial conceptual support for the idea 
that green products and green processes grow out of deeply imbed-
ded characteristics of a particular managerial culture and that adopt-
ing an EMS, while useful, is by itself not likely to lead to such changes. 
Of course, one must also consider that most EMSs in place today are 
still relatively new, as are the studies measuring their impact, and that 
over time implementing EMSs may lead to deeper changes in the en-
vironmentally responsive management culture. Thus, EMS studies 
completed five or ten years from now may find some contribution to 
cleaner operations and products that we cannot establish today.39 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 5–6. 
36 Id. at 6. 
37 Id. at 96. 
38 Id. 
39 Beyond EMSs, there is a broader question of what other policy tools might inspire or 
provoke such changes, but this question is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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D. EMSs—Conclusion 
 The empirical evidence to date supports the conclusion that EMSs 
are generally associated with better environmental performance on 
regulated discharges and on nonregulated resource use. In view of the 
fact that most EMSs are relatively new, as are the studies that have 
evaluated them, there is reason to hope that their environmental per-
formance impacts will increase over time, leading to more good news. 
The news today is, however, less positive when one asks whether facili-
ties that implement EMSs have improved records of compliance with 
environmental regulation. On this point the evidence is simply in con-
flict and more research is necessary. What of greener products and 
processes for industry? Here the evidence, while limited to date, is con-
sistent and negative: EMSs are not associated with greener products or 
processes. While industries are still in the early stage of EMS implemen-
tation, and more work is needed, at this point one must face the pros-
pect that EMSs will not be the means to achieve greener products and 
processes objectives and that other policy tools will be necessary. 
 In addition to EMSs, many companies are taking part in voluntary 
performance standards, and the Article next considers the empirical 
studies of these standards. 
IV. Do Voluntary Performance Standards Actually Improve 
Environmental Performance? 
A. Varieties of Voluntary Standards 
 Because the number of empirical studies of voluntary perform-
ance standards is limited, this Article will discuss the empirical meas-
ures of their environmental performance together. There is substantial 
variation, however, in the different types of voluntary performance 
standards programs and a brief summary of these various types will en-
hance the empirical literature discussion below. The most visible and 
familiar type of performance standards program consists of govern-
ment-sponsored programs, such as the well-known Performance Track 
program.40 Performance Track seeks to identify and recognize corpo-
                                                                                                                      
40 See National Environmental Performance Track, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
perftrac (last visited May 6, 2008). WasteWise and Climate Challenge are other programs of 
this type which are evaluated in the empirical studies discussed below. Climate Challenge, 
DOE’s Energy Partnerships for a Strong Economy, Notice, http://www.climatevision.gov/ 
climate_challenge/climatechallenge.html (last visited May 6, 2008); WasteWise, US EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/wastewise (last visited May 6, 2008). Professors Darnall and Carmin 
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rate and other environmental leaders.41 Companies must apply to join 
the program, but most are accepted, as is often the case for programs 
of this type. Participants make a commitment to environmental per-
formance improvement as measured by one or more specific metrics. 
Typically these metrics require quantified improvement in some aspect 
of performance. Participants receive public recognition, technical ad-
vice and assistance, and in some cases, they may be rewarded with fewer 
regulatory inspections.42 Other government-sponsored programs some-
times offer additional regulatory benefits. Public reporting of results is 
typical, although many programs allow firms to simply leave the pro-
gram, for either poor performance or failure to report, without sanction. 
 A second group of voluntary performance standards programs 
include those programs that are established by an industry trade asso-
ciation or other trade group. The chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
program and the Sustainable Forestry Initiative of the forest products 
industry are two well-known examples.43 In these programs, companies 
commit to environmental performance standards, usually stated quali-
tatively rather than quantitatively, as a condition of membership in the 
sponsoring organization. Technical advice and assistance from the or-
ganization and other members of the group are often included in the 
program, as are public recognition and an improved public image for 
the company and the industry. 
 In the third type of program, an individual company adopts per-
formance standards on its own initiative. A company might commit to a 
specific level of environmental performance beyond regulatory re-
quirements, such as a twenty-five percent reduction in toxic waste dis-
charge. These individual company commitments appear to be increas-
ing, but to date, no systematic empirical evaluation of their 
environmental performance effects exists. 
 Taken together, these programs may have the potential to sub-
stantially improve environmental performance, particularly as their 
numbers and participation levels increases. They have received little 
                                                                                                                      
survey the different types and structures of voluntary environmental programs. Darnall & 
Carmin, supra note 27, at 72. 
41 National Environmental Performance Track, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/perftrac 
(last visited May 6, 2008). 
42 Id. 
43 See International Council of Chemical Associations, Responsible Care, http://www.re- 
sponsiblecare.org (last visited May 6, 2008); SFI: Sustainable Forestry Initiative, http://www. 
sfiprogram.org (last visited May 6, 2008). 
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systematic empirical study, however, and the limited evidence of their 
performance impact is mixed. 
B. The Weight of the Evidence: Voluntary Performance Standards Have Not 
Been Shown to Improve Environmental Performance Generally 
 Most of the studies in this area find that voluntary performance 
standards are not associated with better environmental performance. 
The number of studies is small, however, and this conclusion tentative. 
Thus, the point cannot be taken as conclusively established today. Many 
of these programs are relatively young, and the studies of them are rela-
tively recent, so this result may change over time. Subject to these quali-
fications, the conclusions of studies completed to date are reasonably 
consistent. For example, a study of the Climate Challenge program 
found that “Climate Challenge voluntarism seems to either have no 
effect (in the case of program adoption) or to contribute negatively to 
emission reductions (in the case of specified levels).”44 The Climate 
Challenge program was a voluntary effort established to encourage the 
largest electric utilities to reduce their CO2 emissions; in the program, 
participating firms set their own reduction targets.45 This study looked 
at the emissions of the fifty largest electric utilities east of the Rocky 
Mountains from 1995 to 1997, thirty-five of which participated in the 
program, and it found that membership in the program was not associ-
ated with emissions improvements.46 The authors hypothesized that the 
weak regulatory program for CO2 emissions was the culprit, making 
emissions reduction an environmental performance criterion that did 
not receive serious attention by the companies.47 Of course, to the ex-
tent that this hypothesis is correct, it substantially undercuts the idea 
that voluntary programs can improve environmental performance be-
yond regulatory requirements. 
 Similar results were published in a 2000 study of the chemical in-
dustry’s Responsible Care program in which the authors concluded 
that improved environmental performance, measured by other reports 
outside of the program, was not associated with program member-
                                                                                                                      
44 Eric W. Welch et al., Voluntary Behavior by Electric Utilities: Levels of Adoption and Contri-
bution of the Climate Challenge Program to the Reduction of Carbon Dioxide, 19 J. Pol’y Analysis 
& Mgmt. 407, 421 (2000). Emissions data was reported by the Natural Resources Defense 
Council. Id. at 416. 
45 Id. at 416. 
46 Id. at 422. 
47 Id. 
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ship.48 Responsible Care membership required specified performance 
efforts, as well as management activities. Yet, the program called for 
neither monitoring nor enforcement, and the study’s authors hypothe-
sized that the absence of these two elements was the reason for its poor 
performance showing.49 Since the date of the study, the Responsible 
Care program has been restructured to incorporate both monitoring 
and program sanctions, and future studies may find improved per-
formance. 
 The absence of improved overall performance was also the conclu-
sion of a study of the Sustainable Slopes Program (SSP) of the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA), a voluntary effort to encourage 
ski areas to improve their environmental performance.50 The study 
concluded: 
Additionally our five-year study found no statistical evidence to 
conclude that compared to nonparticipants, SSP ski areas have 
higher overall environmental performance or higher scores in 
the following individual dimensions of environmental protec-
tion: expansion management, pollution management, and 
wildlife and habitat management. SSP participants only appear 
to show a statistically significant correlation with higher natu-
ral resource conservation performance rates.51 
Interestingly, the study found that ski areas wholly or partially on public 
land had poorer performance records. The authors hypothesized that 
the program’s poor results flowed from its lack of either third-party 
monitoring or sanctions for violations.52 
                                                                                                                      
48 Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sacrifice: The 
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 Acad. Mgmt. J. 678, 713 (2000). 
49 Id. 
50 Jorge Rivera et al., Is Greener Whiter Yet? The Sustainable Slopes Program After Five Years, 
34 Pol’y Stud. J. 195, 215 (2006). 
51 Id. The study covered a five-year period and used regression analysis to evaluate the 
data on 110 of the 178 ski areas in the western United States. Id. at 201. Performance data 
was reported by the Ski Area Citizens Association, a partnership of nonprofit environ-
mental organizations that evaluated the ski areas. Id. at 196. This work built on the au-
thors’ earlier study. See Jorge Rivera & Peter de Leon, Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary Environ-
mental Performance of Western Ski Areas, 32 Pol’y Stud. J. 417 (2004). Both of these studies 
were limited by small sample size. 
52 Jorge Rivera et al., supra note 50, at 213. 
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 These results are broadly consistent with the EPA Inspector Gen-
eral’s study of some of the firms in the Performance Track program.53 
As noted above, the Performance Track program consciously sought to 
identify and include environmental leaders. This 2007 study was a 
broad review of the whole program; the portion of interest here looked 
carefully at the environmental performance of forty randomly selected 
program participants.54 The study has both good and bad news: while 
many member-firms had better toxic release performance than their 
respective industries as a whole, a substantial minority of member-firms 
performed worse than their industries.55 The same was true for regula-
tory compliance: while twenty-two of thirty-five facilities had no compli-
ance problems, “Thirteen of the 35 facilities which had inspections had 
more compliance problems than their sector average for one or more 
compliance measures.”56 These examples of poor performance are par-
ticularly discouraging for a program that has consciously targeted envi-
ronmental leaders. 
 The broad conclusion of these studies is that voluntary perform-
ance programs generally have not been shown to be associated with 
better environmental performance. There are, however, some rays of 
light shining through this generally cloudy picture. 
C. Some Limited Evidence of Improved Environmental Performance from 
Voluntary Performance Standards 
 In the mix of largely negative evidence reported above, there are 
some reported bright spots in which voluntary performance standards 
are associated with better environmental performance. Two studies 
found that firms that joined a voluntary program at its early stages 
tended to show better environmental performance than the industry as 
a whole, even though this result was not the case for firms that joined 
later or for the program overall. One study examined firms that par-
ticipated in EPA’s Climate Challenge program.57 As noted above, this 
                                                                                                                      
53 Office of Inspector Gen., supra note 9, at 15–22. This study considered many ad-




56 Id. at 24. 
57 Magali Delmas & Maria J. Montes, Voluntary Agreements to Improve Environmental Qual-
ity: Are Late Joiners Free Riders? 7 (Inst. for Social, Behavioral and Econ. Research (ISBER), 
U.C. Santa Barbara, Working Paper No. 7, 2007). The study used regression analysis to 
control for other variables, including proxies for political pressure, regulatory pressure, 
legislative pressure, relative state commitment to environmental protection, and relative 
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voluntary program sought to encourage reductions in CO2 emissions by 
the largest electric utilities. The early joiners were good prospects for 
improvement; as a group, they had undertaken more emission reduc-
tion efforts prior to joining, and they were subject to greater political 
pressure regarding their emissions.58 An earlier study of EPA’s Waste-
Wise program by one of the same authors reached broadly consistent 
conclusions.59 The WasteWise program sought to encourage voluntary 
reductions in waste generation. While it required annual reporting on 
results, there was no sanction for not reporting. This study found that 
the firms that first joined the program were more likely to report their 
results than late joiners. Interestingly, it also found that other factors, 
such as having an EMS, overall firm size, or the firm’s industry seg-
ment, were not related to reporting rate.60 
 Taken together, these studies offer some support for the idea that 
voluntary performance programs may make a difference for the firms 
that first join them, but that these positive initial results may be 
swamped by a larger group of free riders who subsequently join. The 
studies were not able to evaluate the counterfactual situation—what 
would have been the environmental performance of the early joiners 
if they had not joined? Thus, it may be that joining the program was 
an effect of actual or prospective improvement in environmental per-
formance, rather than a cause. Even so, the result supports the idea 
that the voluntary program was associated with improved perform-
ance, though it resulted from, rather than caused, the improvement. 
 One early study found that firms were more likely to join EPA’s 
33/50 voluntary program when confronted with the prospect of regu-
latory controls as an alternative.61 This program encouraged compa-
nies joining the program to reduce their discharge of seventeen speci-
fied chemicals by thirty-three percent, and subsequently by fifty 
                                                                                                                      
environmental contamination of the state, as well as company-specific factors including 
environmental effort, productive efficiency, and size. Id. at 4–9. It looked at all 124 com-
panies that signed agreements to participate in the program. Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See Magali Delmas & Arturo Keller, Free Riding in Voluntary Environmental Programs: 
The Case of the U.S. EPA WasteWise Program, 38 Pol’y Sci. 91, 104–05 (2005). This study used 
a regression analysis to evaluate survey data from the 106 companies that responded, 
which represented 11.2% of the 947 companies in the program. Id. 
60 Id. at 101–02. While useful, this study is limited because it only measured whether 
firms reported, not whether they reported positive results. Id. at 96–97. As noted in the 
previous footnote, it was based on a survey of 947 firms, but had only an 11.2% response 
rate (106 firms), further qualifying its results. Id. 
61 Madhu Khanna & Lisa A. Damon, EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Re-
leases and Economic Performance of Firms, 37 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 1, 23 (1999). 
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percent over the term of the program.62 In a study of the chemical 
industry firms that joined, the authors concluded: 
Expected gains due to public recognition and technical assis-
tance offered by the program and the potential to avoid li-
abilities and high costs of compliance in the future under 
mandatory environmental regulations provided incentives for 
participation in the program. This suggests that participation 
in voluntary programs depends to a considerable extent on 
the existence of a regulatory framework that would impose 
penalties on firms that do not undertake proactive measures 
for self-regulation. Voluntary programs are likely to be less ef-
fective without the backstop of mandatory regulation.63 
There was also good performance news. The study compared the 
member companies’ environmental performance on releases of the 
seventeen toxic chemicals to their predicted releases prior to joining 
the program. Even after controlling for sample selection bias, the im-
pact of regulations, and firm specific factors, the study found: 
While the amount of pollution reductions that can be attrib-
uted to the program is less than the total observed reduction 
by participants, the program is estimated to have led to a re-
duction of 28% in expected 33/50 releases relative to the 
preprogram level over the period 1991–93.64 
Thus, the voluntary program was associated with some of the positive 
performance results. 
 One review of EPA’s Strategic Goals program also found some 
qualified good news.65 The Strategic Goals program was a voluntary 
program aimed at improving the environmental performance of firms 
in the metal finishing industry. EPA’s mid-term report showed reduc-
tions by participating firms, with a 58.7% reduction in air and water 
emissions, a 3% reduction in sludge production, and a 15% reduction 
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. 
63 Id. This study used regression analysis to evaluate TRI data on 123 firms that were in 
the chemical industry and eligible to participate in the program during its first three years, 
1991 to 1993, the time period of the study. Id. at 4–7. 
64 Id. at 23. 
65 Jason Scott Johnston, The Promise and Limits of Voluntary Management-Based Regulatory 
Reform: An Analysis of EPA’s Strategic Goals Program, in Leveraging the Private Sector: 
Management-Based Strategies for Improving Environmental Performance, supra 
note 1, at 167, 180–84. 
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in land disposal of toxic wastes.66 Yet this good news was qualified by the 
study’s overall conclusion that the program’s low participation rate and 
failure to meet its goals provided good reasons for discontinuing it.67 
Whatever the reason, the Strategic Goals program was neither renewed 
nor extended when it reached the end of its initial term in 2003. 
 As discussed above, some positive results were reported in the 
EPA Inspector General’s study of the Performance Track program.68 
Of the forty entities that were randomly selected for study, most mem-
bers in the program had better performance on toxic waste emissions 
and on regulatory compliance than their respective industries. Over-
all, this study was critical of the program and its results, but this posi-
tive data should be noted. 
 Despite these individual bright spots, the composite picture is gray. 
Why are these voluntary performance programs not associated with 
better environmental performance? The programs and these studies 
are all relatively recent, so perhaps better performance is coming and 
will be revealed in future performance improvements, which the next 
generation of studies will find. In the current group of studies, the con-
sensus explanation is that the programs are not very successful because, 
in general, they do not have effective monitoring and sanctions for 
poor program performance. Indeed, most do not have any monitoring 
or sanction. Thus, the argument runs, firms can join them without ei-
ther a demonstrated history of real environmental effort or a real con-
temporary commitment to sustained environmental improvement in 
the future. When real effort is required to improve environmental per-
formance, there is insufficient company commitment for the program 
to succeed. 
 One interesting study offers results that are generally consistent 
and supportive. It was not a study of environmental performance, but 
rather a study of what firms join what kinds of voluntary programs. 
Specifically, this study of 400 firms compared the environmental per-
formance of firms that join different kinds of voluntary programs. It 
found that firms that pollute less join programs that have monitoring 
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. One Minnesota study of its participating firms was reported to have concluded 
that they performed better than nonparticipating firms. Id. at 182–83. 
67 Id. at 180–83. Professor Johnston also notes that the standards set were not very de-
manding, as they were below the standards set by an industry best practices group, and 
that the program back dated its baseline performance period to 1992, in effect counting as 
improvements many gains that were achieved before the Strategic Goals Program began. 
Id. 
68 Office of Inspector Gen., supra note 9, at 23–26. 
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and that actually sanction violators by expulsion, such as the Sustain-
able Forestry Initiative. In contrast, the firms that join programs that do 
not monitor or issue sanctions, such as the former Responsible Care 
program, have worse pollution records than their industry averages.69 
These findings suggest that firms choose programs, and thus, program 
design may be quite important to observed environmental perform-
ance results. 
Conclusion 
 Do voluntary environmental programs improve environmental 
performance? The studies do not definitively answer the question. To 
be sure, there is substantial support for the point that implementation 
of an EMS is associated with better environmental performance, both 
on regulated emissions and on the use of resources that are not directly 
regulated. Unfortunately, the studies to date do not offer support for 
the hope that EMSs will be associated with adopting greener products 
and processes. For this important environmental policy objective, the 
evidence to date argues that other policy tools will be needed. Taken 
together, the studies are still too few, qualified, and diffuse to consider 
either of these conclusions to be well enough established that they can 
serve as an acceptable basis for making new policy that either promotes 
or discourages EMSs. 
 With voluntary performance standards, the data is both more 
limited and less conclusive. While some bright spots can be found, the 
overall picture is a gloomy one. There is limited support for the posi-
tion that the participants in these programs can be reasonably ex-
pected to have better environmental performance. When considering 
both EMSs and performance standards, one must remember that the 
programs are relatively new, and the limited number of studies are 
recent. Further work is needed. 
 One final methodological note is necessary. Many of these studies 
have had to work with less than ideal data sets, presumably because 
the needed information is difficult to collect. While data on regulated 
emissions and discharges is reasonably available, data on other kinds 
of environmental impacts is not, and must typically be gathered by 
third parties or directly from the companies that are willing to dis-
close such information. This observation is also true for information 
                                                                                                                      
69 Michael J. Lenox & Jennifer Nash, Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection: A 
Comparison Across Four Trade Association Programs, 12 Bus. Strategy & Env’t 343, 348–355 
(2003). 
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regarding the existence and content of EMSs, and for voluntary pro-
grams, unless they have a government sponsor that requires data col-
lection and disclosure. Thus, studies must often use survey evidence, 
and they frequently have smaller sample sizes than is preferable. Many 
have been successful in addressing these problems, but these are limi-
tations that must also be considered in conducting the necessary work 
in this area in the future. 
 For the present, a policy of benign neglect by the traditional regu-
latory system seems to be appropriate. Voluntary efforts offer a tantaliz-
ing prospect of real improvement in environmental performance, and 
they should continue. There is only limited and conflicting empirical 
support for the possibility of improvement, however. Better program 
design, with real monitoring and performance sanctions, and new and 
better studies, may provide empirical support for incorporating volun-
tary efforts into the public regulatory system for containing environ-
mental risks. The empirical support is not yet there. 
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